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A Nobel Tiger In The Tail
by David R. Henderson
Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2004
This year's Nobel Prize winners in economics -- 60-year-old Norwegian Finn 
Kydland and 63-year-old American Edward Prescott -- earned the award for 
contributions on the "time-inconsistency problem" and "real business cycles." 
These terms may sound arcane, and, to some, irrelevant. They're not. In fact, 
the laureates' insights are crucial to current policy issues.
Take real business cycles. The Keynesian view, which had dominated from 
the late 1930s to the '70s, could not account for the combination of high 
inflation and low growth, "stagflation," that occurred in the early '70s. 
Virtually all of the action in the Keynesian model was on the demand side. 
But Kydland and Prescott pointed out that supply-side shocks, such as 
increases in oil prices to an oil-importing country, could slow growth and 
increase inflation and unemployment at the same time. Also, they noted, if 
technological change occurs unevenly -- which it does -- that could account 
for differences in growth rates over time. Indeed, their model showed that 
such "real changes," as opposed to demand-side changes emphasized by 
Keynesians, could account for 70% of the U.S. economy's postwar fluctuations 
in  real output. Their work was one of the bigger nails in the Keynesian coffin. 
How about time inconsistency? A huge issue facing government policy 
makers is inflation, which is caused by government increasing the money 
supply too quickly. Because high inflation is bad, a government concerned 
about its citizens' well-being would avoid high inflation. But governments are 
tempted to increase inflation in the short run to drive down unemployment. 
This is the time-inconsistency problem. As people come to expect high 
inflation, governments find themselves driving inflation ever higher, as 
happened in the '60s and '70s. As early as 1959, Friedrich Hayek anticipated 
this problem and, later, called it having "a tiger by the tail."
What's the way out, assuming we don't abolish central banks? In 1985, 
economist Ken Rogoff, drawing on Kydland's and Prescott's work, called for 
an independent central bank, headed by someone highly averse to inflation 
who would resist the government's pressure to inflate. Just two years later, 
inflation hawk Alan Greenspan became chairman of the Fed. The result: in the 
last 17 years, U.S. inflation has averaged only 3%. And this overstates 
inflation by about one percentage point annually because the consumer price 
index fails to account adequately for quality increases and for the "Wal-Mart 
effect" of people purchasing lower-price items at big-box stores. Reforms that 
gave more independence to central banks in New Zealand, Sweden and the 
U.K. were explicitly based on Kydland's and Prescott's work.
One Kydland/Prescott example of time inconsistency relates to patent 
protection. Patents are legal monopolies for a fixed number of years that exist 
to encourage innovation. But once the innovation occurs, governments are 
tempted to let others violate intellectual property rights by imitating the 
invention. This brings the price down and helps current consumers. The 
future result will be less innovation and less consumer well-being. Canada's 
government does that with drugs: it threatens drug companies with its power 
to license generics even while the patent is in force, and uses this stick to 
negotiate lower drug prices. Future generations pay.
Take another example of time inconsistency: the Social Security nightmare in 
our future. In a November 2003 paper, Mr. Prescott shows that the reason the 
average American age 15 to 64 works 50% more hours than his counterpart in 
Germany or France is that marginal tax rates in those countries are about 
60%, whereas in the U.S. they're more like 40%. Mr. Prescott points out that in 
the early '70s, when marginal tax rates between Western Europe and the U.S. 
were almost identical, so were working hours.
* * *
How does this relate to Social Security? Many people anticipate keeping 
promises to the elderly by raising Social Security taxes dramatically in the 
next 10 to 20 years. But, writes Mr. Prescott, "The high labor supply elasticity 
[work hours fall as tax rates rise] does mean that . . . promises of payments to 
the current and future old cannot be financed by increasing tax rates." He has 
a solution. He writes, "These promises can be honored by reducing the 
effective marginal tax rate on labor and moving toward retirement systems 
with the property that benefits on margin increase proportionally to 
contributions."
In other words, privatize Social Security so that what otherwise would be 
taxes are in fact people's contributions to their own retirement. For that 
insight alone, every American under age 55 should thank Mr. Prescott. Here's 
mine.
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